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COMMENTS
CONTEMPT-ATTORNEYS NOT "OFFICERS OF THE COURT" WITHIN
FEDERAL CONTEMPT STATUTE--EFFECT UPON AVAILABILITY OF
CONTEMPT SANCTION AGAINST ATTORNEYS IMPROPERLY
CONTACTING GRAND JURORS
Cammer v. United States, 850 U.S. 399 (1956)
A federal grand jury indicted petitioner's client for filing a false
non-communist affidavit. Without the knowledge or permission of the
court, petitioner mailed identical letters and questionnaires to those
grand jurors who were employees of the federal government in an
attempt to determine whether their relationship with the government
would influence their decision. Petitioner was cited for contempt
under section 401(2) of the federal contempt statute, which em-
powers a federal court to punish as contempt "misbehavior of any
of its officers in their official transactions" :2 it was held that petitioner
was an "officer of the court" and that sending the questionnaires con-
stituted misbehavior in an official transaction. 2 The Supreme Court
reversed, construing section 401(2) as including only conventional
court officers such as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks, and judges, and
held that an attorney is not an "officer of the court" within the mean-
ing of the section. 3
While section 401(2) has seldom been invoked against attorneys, 4
1. 18 U.S.C. § 401(2) (1952). Section 401 in its entirety provides:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or impris-
onment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice;(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command.
The statute, originally adopted in 1831 (4 STAT. 487 (1831)), has been construed
as a drastic limitation upon the original common-law power of the federal courts
to punish for contempt. In the Matter of Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945);
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45 (1941). For a discussion of the events
leading to its passage, see Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication, 28 CoLUM.
L. REv. 401, 423-30 (1928). Whether this limitation applies to the Supreme Court,
the existence and powers of which are derived from the Constitution, is still an
open question. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1873).
2. Cammer v. United States, 233 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1955), affinming 122
F. Supp. 388 (1954).
3. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956).
4. The only decisions which have been found applying § 401(2) to attorneys
are United States v. Zavelo, 177 Fed. 536 (C.C.N.D. AIa. 1910) (causing privileged
witnesses to be served with civil process) and Ex parte Davis, 112 Fed. 139
(C.C.D. Fla. 1901) (maliciously securing issuance of a summons in ejectment
against judge in case involving land which was subject of suit). For cases in
which it was stated in dicta that attorneys were "officers of the court" under
§ 401(2), see United States ex rel. Hallett v. Green, 85 Fed. 857, 859 (C.C.D.
Colo. 1898); Bogart v. Electric Supply Co., 27 Fed. 722, 723 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
The great majority of cases in which attorneys were cited for contempt have
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no case prior to the instant decision has been found in which it has
been held or even suggested that attorneys were not officers of the
court for the purposes of that section. When there has arisen the
question whether the attorney's conduct fell within section 401(2),
the issue has generally been whether the conduct constituted an
"official transaction.", Recent decisions had indicated that, in the
instant case, the necessity of construing the term "officers of the
court" could have been avoided by reversing on the ground that pe-
titioner's conduct was not an "official transaction." While the Court
did not consider this as the crucial issue, it is submitted that had it
done so and held that petitioner's conduct was an "official transac-
tion," it would have been plausible for the Court to conclude further
that attorneys are "officers of the court" under section 401(2)..7 and
been based on violations of § 401(1). See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 97 F.2d
:178 t2d Cir. 1938) (nisconduct in the courtroom); United States v. Frank, 53
FK2d 128 (D.N.J. 1931) (knowingly presenting false answers).
F' r an example of the application of § 401(3), see Bogart v. Electric Supply(Xf,, 27 Fed. 722 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), where an attorney was cited for refusal to
ohey a court order.
5, Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312 (Ist Cir. 1954); Cammer v. United
States, 223 F.2d 322, 330 (D.C. Cir. 195-5) (dissenting opinion),
6. Admittedly there is plausibility in the argument that "if lawyers are coveredby this section of the Act they are engaged in official transactions whenever en-
gaged in the 'practice of the profession."' 350 U.S. at 404. On the other hand,
whilt- consideration of this point may be academic in relation to the instant case,
it is felt that the tenor of prior recent decisions had indicated that the phrase, "offi-
cial t ransactions" under § 401 (2) was to be severely limited and would not have en-
compassed appellant's conduct. See In the Matter of Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227(1945); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33,44-48 (1941)- Farese v. United States,209 F.2d 312, 3115 (Ist Cir. 1954); Schmidt v. United Atates, 124 F.2d 177 (6th
Cir, 1941), oz'crrzding Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940).
Moreover, it was held in the Michael case that a court-appointed trustee, an officer
of the court, was not engaging in an official transaction when he perjured himself
before a grand jury conducting a general inquiry. This would appear to indicate
that it would not have been sufficient to constitute an "official transaction" merely
that a communication concerning a matter under the court's consideration passedbetween two officers of the court, as strongly suggested by the court of appeals in
the instant case. Cammer v. United States, 223 F.2d 322, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Furthermore, when considering the term "official" as it is commonly under-
stood, it is difficult to conclude that appellant's conduct could have been held to be
"official." An act is "official," as distinguished from the act of any individual,
if it is done by an officer under color and by virtue of his office. Lammon v. Feusier,
I I I U.S. 17 (1884) ; Alford v. McConnell, 27 F. Supp. 176 (N.D. Okla. 1939). If
a pez son's office gives him authority to act, he is acting by virtue of his office even
though he improperly exercises his authority. Greenius v. American Surety Co.,
92 Wash. 401, 404, 139 Pac. 384, 385 (1916). It is that which is "derived from
the proper office or officer, or from the proper authorit; made or communicated
by virtue f authority; uth authoritative.... Mniunx-W Ssa NUV
INTERNATIONAL DicTIONAY (2d ed, 1954). It is submitted that the office of
attorney at law grants no special authority to its holder to communicate with grandjurors as it does to give legal advice or draft legal documents, and if an attorneyso acts he is not acting "officially" but rather is in the same position as any other
indivliual,J 7 The proponent of the resolution of 1831 directing the Committee on theudiciary to inquire into the expediency of defining by statute offenses which
might be punished as contempts, stated that while it might be difficult to define con-tempts, it should not be difficult to define what were not contempts so that anyonelooking at the statute could inform himself as to whether he was acting within the
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thereby affirm the contempt citation. On the other hand, the decision
realistically recognizes the difficulty of defning an "official trans-
action."" Moreover, it encourages the independence of the bar by
removing any fear on the part of attorneys that, if they are con-
sidered to be officers of the court for purposes of the contempt statute,
the phrase "official transaction" might be used to bring all aspects
of the legal profession relating to federal practice within the scope of
the contempt power of the federal courts.9 Finally, the decision pre-
vents the use of the contempt power to fine or imprison an attorney,
as an attorney, without a trial0 in a situation similar to that in the
principal case where the use of such power is unnecessary-unneces-
sary because the damage had already been completed"' and also be-
law. 7 CONG. DEE. 560, 561 (1831). Therefore, with this expression of legislativeintent in mind, if Congress did not intend that attorneys be considered "officers of
the court," it would appear that Congress simply would have specifically excluded
attorneys from § 401(2).
Furthermore, the construction of the phrase "officers of the court" in theprincipal case was based partly on Congressman Buchanan's statements in regard
to the independence of the bar made at the impeachment trial of Judge Peck who
was being tried for his alleged abuse in exercising the contempt powers of thefederal courts. 350 U.S. at 405-07. The Court stressed the fact that Buchanan
reported the 1831 Act to the House of Representatives. Id. at 407. But is it notthen plausible to conclude that if Buchanan felt that attorneys should not be con-
sidered "officers of the court" within the contempt statute, he would have argued
this point in Congress?
8. 350 U.S. at 404. See note 6 sup'ra.9. Ibid., where it is declared that an "official transaction" plausibly couldinclude any activity of an attorney when engaged in the practice of the profession.See also Congressman Buchanan's statements advocating the need to maintain
the independence of the bar. Id. at 406-07 quoting from STANSBURY, REPORT OF
THE TRIAL OF JAmEs H. PECK 445, 455 (1833).10. Contempts are classified as civil and criminal. A civil contempt consists
of failure to obey a court order; the sanctions applied are remedial and serve
only the purposes of the complainant. A criminal contempt, on the other hand,
exists where the acts are considered an injury to the court; the sanctions imposed
are solely for the purpose of punishment, thereby serving as a deterrent against
similar future conduct. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). See McCrone v.United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939).
Criminal contempts are punishable summarily by the federal courts if thejudge knows of the contumacious conduct from his own personal knowledge. In
all other alleged criminal contempts the defendant is entitled at least to notice andhearing except in those cases where Congress has specifically guaranteed the
right to a jury trial. FED. R. CRnIx. P. 42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1952), whichprovides for a jury trial in cases where the conduct also constitutes a criminal
offense under an act of Congress or under the laws of the state in which the
conduct occurred. This section, however, does not apply to contempts falling
within § 401(1) of the federal contempt statute. See text supported by note 12
infra. Apparently it is felt that in the latter situation, a court must be em-powered to punish the contempt quickly-not only to maintain the respect due the
court but also to be able to proceed with the orderly conduct of its business.11. The passage of the act of 1831 was intended to safeguard constitutional
procedures by limiting the contempt powers of federal courts to "the least possiblepower adequate to the end proposed." In the Matter of Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227(1945). In Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), it was stated that
"the pith of this extraordinary power to punish without the formalities requiredby the Bill of Rights for the prosecution of federal crimes generally2 is that thenecessities of the adminis ration of justice reqire it. It was s id n Farese v.
United States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954), that the cases In the Matter of
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cause such misconduct could be as effectively discouraged through the
prophylactics of suspension or disbarment.
Insofar as the federal contempt statute is concerned, the principal
case, by excluding attorneys from section 401 (2), in effect places them
in the same category as laymen whose conduct is governed by section
401 (1). The latter section empowers federal courts to punish as con-
tempt "misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice." 12 Therefore, in order to
determine when an attorney's improper contact with grand jurors
will be considered a contempt in the future, it is necessary to inquire
into the judicial interpretations given the phrases "in the presence of"
and "so near thereto."
The leading authority construing "in the presence of" is the case of
Savin, Petitioner," in which appellant was cited for contempt for
approaching a witness in a temporary witness room of the courthouse
in an attempt to deter the witness from testifying for the government.
It was stated that "the court, at least when in session, is present in
every part of the place set apart for its owm use, and for the use of
its officers, jurors, and witnesses; and misbehavior anywhere in such
place is misbehavior in the presence of the court."'' 4 This geographical
construction of the phrase has since been closely observed by the
courts. For example, it has been held to be contempt to assault a mar-
shal in the courtroom, 5 to send a contumacious letter to a judge in
his chambers during a short recess, 6 to falsely represent vis-a-vis
the court that one is a practicing attorney of another jurisdiction, 7
to knowingly file false answers,ls or to give contumacious answers to
Michael, supra, and Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), teach that the grant
of summary power ought to be narrowly construed so that denials of the right to a
jury trial will be narrowly restricted to those "bedrock" cases where exercise of
the power is necessary to enable the courts to preserve their authority and insure
the maintenance of order and decorum of the courtroom. In the principal case,
since any harmful effect of the questionnaires was complete when the jurors re-
ceived them in the mail, the invocation of the contempt power was unnecessary.
As the Court in the principal case pointed out, 350 U.S. at 407, if petitioner
had been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952), he would have been
entitled to a jury trial after indictment by a grand jury. See note 33 infra.
12. See note 1 supra.
13. 131 U.S. 267 (1889).
14. Id. at 277. The Court pointed out that this view rendered it unnecessary
to construe the words "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."
14L at 278. See Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 280 (1889) (petition for habeas corpus
by one cited for contempt for attempting to influence a prospective juror denied
on the ground that both the petition and the record were silent as to the location
of the alleged contempt).
15. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
16. Cooke v. United States, 295 Fed. 292 (5th Cir. 1923), rev'd o. procedual
grounds, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
17. Bowles v. United States, 50 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1931).
18. United States v. Frank, 53 F.2d 128 (D.N.J. 1931). See also Laughlin v.
United States, 151 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Where individuals secured court
approval of a fictitious settlement of pending litigation by means of misrepresen-
tations through innocent counsel in open court, it was held to be contempt in the
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a grand jury and to attempt to influence a witness in a hall adjacent
to a grand-jury room while the grand jury was in session."9 On the
other hand, where the wife of a chief witness in a criminal trial was
threatened in the corridors of a courthouse after the day's proceed-
ings were concluded, it was held that no contempt was committed.
Since the wife was not connected with the court in any official capacity
and since there was nothing shown to indicate that the court was not
adjourned, it was concluded that it would unduly stretch the con-
cept of presence to hold the court present in the corridors.20
To be contrasted with the consistent restrictive interpretation
placed upon "in the presence of" is the gamut which has been run by
the phrase "so near thereto." Prior to Nye v. United States, 21 "so
near thereto" was broadly construed in accordance with Toledo News-
paper Co. v. United States,22 in which it was held that the test of
includibility of acts within section 401(1) was their "reasonable ten-
dency" to obstruct the administration of justice.23 Under this decision
the phrase was not geographically construed, but rather, embraced
acts occurring far from the courtroom. 24 Toledo, however, was over-
ruled by the Nye case, which drastically limited the concept of "so
near thereto": the exercise of improper influence on an administrator
of an estate one hundred miles away from the courthouse was held
not to be a contempt. The Court stated that the phrase must be given
a geographical connotation rather than a causal one, i.e., to be punish-
able as an obstruction to the administration of justice under section
401 (1), the misbehavior must be in such proximity to the court as to
presence of the court, the theory being that although the conspiracy to commit
the contempt occurred outside the presence of the court, it was consummated in
the court's presence. United States v. Pendergast, 39 F. Supp. 189 (W.D. Mo.
1941), aff'd sub nom. O'Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942),
rev'd holding that even if the conduct were a contempt any action was barred by
the statute of limitations sub nom. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412
(1943).
Perjury, however, even though committed in court is not alone sufficient to
sustain a contempt citation. Matusow v. United States, 229 F.2d 335 (5th Cir.
1956). See also In the Matter of Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) ; Ex parte Hudg-
ings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919) (to uphold contempt citation for perjury would mean
that any judge in any case could imprison a man merely because judge thought
witness untruthful). But see Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932) (perjury
by prospective juror on voir dire examination held to be contempt, the theory being
that while perjury by witness is not alone sufficient obstruction to judicial power
since obstruction is only that inherent in testifying falsely and can be appropri-
ately remedied by indictment, perjury resulting in acceptance of prejudicial juror
sterilizes trial ab initio).
19. In re Presentment by Grand Jury of Ellison, 44 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del.
1942), aff'd, 133 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 791 (1943).
20. Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312 (1st Cir. 1954).
21. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
22. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
23. Id. at 421.
24. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749 (1929); McCann v. New
York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1935) (dictum).
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disrupt the order and decorum of the courtroom.23 Thus, pursuant
to the Nge doctrine, it has been held that the following conduct fell
within neither the concept of "so near thereto" nor that of "in the
presence of": attempt to influence petit juror sixty miles from the
courthouse, '- and, in another case, two or three blocks from the court-
house.-" unauthorized examination of prospective jurors fourteen
miles from the courthouse;-" filing affidavits improperly obtained from
grand jurors away from the courthouse; 0 and circulating advertise-
ments among prospective jurors for the purpose of improperly in-
fluencing them., '
The result of the Nye case was to bring the meaning of "so near
thereto" closely in line with the meaning of "in the presence of."
Oddly enough, however, it appears that the latter phrase has emerged
with a somewhat broader construction than the former. That is, in
order for misbehavior which obstructs the administration of justice
to be considered within the "presence of' the court, it need not dis-
rupt the order and decorum of an official court proceeding as required
within the meaning of "so near thereto," but need only occur some-
where in the courthouse while the court is in session, or if not in
session, occur in relation to an appendage of the court, such as a grand
jury, which is transacting business pertaining to the court.31 But
conceivably the more restrictive Nye construction of "so near thereto"
could be applied so as to encroach upon the concept of "in the presence
of," - thus limiting the latter to conduct vis-a-vis the court or one of
its organs.
In conclusion, since an attorney's conduct will not be regarded as
contemptuous unless it falls within section 401(1), the present con-
struction of the phrases "in the presence of' and "so near thereto"
indicates that an attorney's improper contact with a grand juror away
from the courthouse will not constitute a contempt. Furthermore, if
5 313 U.S. at 48-49, 52.
26. Winberly v. United States, 119 F.2d 713 (5th Cik. 1941).
17, WeKe( v United States, 126 F 12d 470 (6th Cir. 942) See also Calvares!
v. United States, 216 F2d 891 (loth Cir. t954).
28. United States v. Welch, 154 F.2d 705 (3d Ck. 1946).
29. Schmidt v. United States, 124 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1941), overruifng Schmidt
v. United States, 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940).
30. United States ex rel. May v. American Mach. Co, 116 F. Supp. 160
(E.D. Wash. 1953).
31. This distinction was recognized in In re Presentment by Grand Jury of
Ellison, 44 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1942), aff'd, 133 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 791 (1943); Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312 (1st Cir. 1954);
Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209 (lst Cir. 1954) (dictum); United States
v. Pendergast, 39 F. Supp. 189 (W.D. Mo. 1941), a4'd sub nor. OMalley v.
United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Ci'. 1942), rev'd, holding th t even if the conduct
was a contempt any action was barred by the statute of imitations sub nor.
Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943). See Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33, 48 (1941).
32. See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48, 52 (1941) (sem&be).
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the conduct is not indictable,33 the only sanctions available would be
suspension or disbarment.
TRADE REGULATION-RESALE PRICE MIMNTENANCE--CONTRACTS
BETWEEN PARTIALLY INTEGRATED CORPORATIONS AND
COMPETING WHOLESALERS
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. S05 (1956)
Defendant corporation, in addition to wholesaling the drug products
of various manufacturers, manufactures similar commodities which
are distributed through its wholesale outlets and through independent
wholesale outlets.' Defendant executed contracts with independent
wholesalers establishing stipulated resale prices for its products. The
Justice Department instituted a civil suit based upon the allegation
that since these "fair trade" agreements were executed with persons
with whom defendant competed, section one of the Sherman Antitrust
Act 2 had been violated. Defendant maintained that the contracts were
lawful under amendments which created specific statutory exceptions3
to the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, reversing the lower court,4
held that the contracts were "illegal per se" under section one of the
act.5
Section one of the Sherman Act proscribes "every contract, combi-
nation . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . ." In two early
cases construing this section the Supreme Court evolved two impor-
tant doctrines. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States7 the Court stated
that only unreasonable restraints of trade were proscribed; but in Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons," it was held that price fix-
ing agreements affecting interstate commerce were per se restraints
of trade under section one.9 Shortly after the Miles case fair trade
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952) provides that any person is liable to prosecution
by indictment if he corruptly or by threats or force endeavors to influence, intimi-
date, or impede any juror, witness, or officer in the discharge of his duty, or
obstruct the due administration of justice.
1. Defendant corporation consists of a single manufacturing division and 74
wholesale outlets. Its total sales for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1954, were
$338,000,000. The self-manufactured products furnished only $11,000,000, or
slightly more than 3% of the total sales. United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). See text supported by note 6
infra for the pertinent provision of this section.
3. Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952); McGuire
Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
4. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
5. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
6. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
7. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
8. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
9. The illegal per se rule was rigidly adhered to by the Court. Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (price fixing illegal
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